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Abstract 
 
We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models 
where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic 
social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We 
examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of 
both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have 
two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot 
equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits 
and domestic social surplus and compare the volume 
of commodities for various combinations of weak and 
strong leaders and followers.  
 
Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium, mixed duopoly 
model 
 
1.Introduction 
     Examinations of mixed oligopolies, in which social 
surplus-maximizing public firms compete against 
profit-maximizing private firms, have become 
increasingly popular in recent years. For pioneering 
works on mixed oligopolies, see [2], [5]. Excellent 
surveys can be found in [1], [6]. 
     The interest in mixed oligopolies is high because of 
their importance in economies of Europe (Germany, 
England and others), Canada and Japan. There are 
examples of mixed oligopolies in United States such as 
the packaging and overnight-delivery industries. Mixed 
oligopolies are also common in the East European and 
former Soviet Union transitional economies, in which 
competition among public and private firms exists or 
still exists  in many industries such as banking, house 
loan, airline, telecommunication, natural gas, electric 
power, hospital, health care, railways and others. 
     These situations have been investigated in different 
ways. Many works analyzed Cournot and Stackelberg 
models with the role of each firm given exogenously. 
However, it is more reasonable to assume that each 
firm decides what actions to take and when to take 
them.  
     DeFraja and Delbono [1] are pioneers in these kinds 
of works. They showed that in simultaneous-move 
games, privatization of the public firm may improve 
welfare. In the paper by Matsumura [4], the author 
investigates mixed duopoly and analyzes a desirable 
role (either leader or follower) of the public firm, when 
the inverse demand function ( )Gpp =   is concave. 
Under these conditions, Matsumura founds that the 
role of he public firm should be that of the leader. 
Matsumura also establishes the domestic social surplus 
in a mixed duopoly is greater than in a monopolistic 
market.  
       We want to examine the desirable role of the 
domestic public firm. In contrast to [4], here we 
consider an inverse demand function convex. In this 
case the role of the domestic public firm could be the 
leader or the follower, this role depends on the reaction 
function of private foreign firm. 
       In section 2, the model is described. We 
demonstrate theorems of existence and uniqueness in 
the Cournot problem. We define the concept of a 
strong firm and a weak firm. These definitions are 
based on the reaction function of every firm at the 
Cournot equilibrium. 
      Section 3 deals with the game where the domestic 
public firm is the leader and the private foreign firm is 
the follower. The private foreign firm will always be a 
weak firm. 
      Section 4 considers the game where the domestic 
public firm is the follower and the private foreign firm 
is the leader. The domestic public firm may have two 
different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot 
equilibrium, and as a consequence this firm could be 
weak or strong. The paper is finished with Conclusion. 
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2. The Model Specification 
 
     Consider two firms producing a homogeneous 
product. Let G  represent the total output, and ( )Gp  
denote an inverse demand function, i.e. the price of a 
unit of the product. The goods produced by the two 
firms are sold at the domestic market. Let 
21,i,q i =   , denote the output of firm i . At last, let 
( )ii qf  stand for the production cost by firm i . Let G  
be the total output; i. e.  
                   21 qqG +=  .                            (1) 
    Firm 1 is a foreign private firm, which maximizes its 
own profits and firm 2 is a domestic public firm which 
maximizes domestic social surplus. Domestic social 
surplus S is the sum of consumer surplus and profits 
of firm 2: 
    
( ) ( ) ( )( )221
0
21
21
qfqGpdxxp)q,q(S
qq
+−= 
+
 . (2)      
The profit of firm 1 is given by:  
     
( ) ( )111211 qfqGp)q,q( −=Π .              (3)      
             We accept the following assumptions 
concerning the price function and cost functions: 
      A1.   Let ( ) 0≥Gp   be a twice continuously 
differentiable convex function defined over 0>G  , 
with ( ) 0<′ Gp , and ( )GGp  being a strictly concave 
function.  
       A2.   We assume that ( )ii qf , 21,i = , are 
functions continuously differentiable, non decreasing 
and convex, defined over 0≥iq . 
       A3. For 1=i , there exists an 01 >H , such that:   
( ) ( )111 HpHf =′  
whereas for 2=i , there exists an 02 >H , such that:  
( ) ( ) ( )222
2
1
12 1 H'fHpH
HHHp =′





+− . 
        A4. Principle of Potential Participation. 
For 1=i  there exist 00 >G  and 001 >q  such that 
0GG <  implies that 011 qq < : 
                 
( ) ( ) ( ) 011 >′−′+ qfGGpGp .                 (4) 
Remark 1.  Examples of functions that satisfy A1, A3 
and A4 are: ( ) γ−= AGGp ; with 10 << γ ; among 
others.                                                                           
Remark 2. As ( ) 0<G'p  and  ( ) 0=
∞→
G'plim
G
, the 
relationship  
   
( ) ( ) ( )222
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



+−  
from assumption A3 implies that there exists an 
03 >H  such that  
   
( ) ( ) ( ) 01 22
2
1
1 <−





+− q'fG'p
H
HHGp   
for all 32 HqG >≥ .                                                     
 
Lemma 1. Under assumptions A1 and A2, firm 1’s 
profits function ( )211 q,qΠ  is concave with respect to 
1q .                                                                                 
Lemma 2. Under assumptions A1 and A2, the 
domestic social surplus function ( )21 q,qS  is concave 
with respect to 2q .                                                          
 
       We compare the equilibrium volumes for various 
scenarios. First we define the classical Cournot 
equilibrium, i.e., a vector ( ) 321 +∈= Rq,q,GZ , such 
that 
                  
=
=
2
1i
iqG ,                                             (5)                                                             
 
( ) ( ) ( )
;q
,GpG'pqq'f,q
0
00
11
11111
=
≥−−≡≥
ϕ
ϕ
  and
    
       (6)                                                                 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,GpG'pqGq'f,q 00 22222 ≥−−+≡≥ ϕ       
and  022 =ϕq .                                                          (7)             
Theorem 1. Let assumptions A1 - A4 be valid. Then 
problem (5) – (7) has a (nontrivial) solution.               
 
Definition 1.  Let [ ]21 q,q,GZ =  be an equilibrium, i. 
e. a solution of Cournot model (5) – (7). We say that 
this equilibrium is non-monopolistic if 
21,i,Gq i =<   . 
Theorem 2. Under assumptions A1 – A4 the cleared 
market quantity G  is the same at each non-
monopolistic equilibrium.                                             
 
Definition 2. We say that firm i is strong if the right 
derivate of its reaction function is positive at the 
Cournot equilibrium: ( ) 00 >+Ci G'q . On the other 
hand, firm i  is called weak if its reaction function’s 
derivative  has a non-positive value at the Cournot 
equilibrium: ( ) 00 ≤+Ci G'q . 
      In other words, firm i  is strong if it is ready to 
increase its production volume beyond its Cournot 
optimal response value even if the price is going down. 
Otherwise, firm i  is a weak firm.   
       Now we accomplish a comparative analysis for 
various strategies of the firms. We are going to 
compare the volume of the Cournot equilibrium 
CG with the Stackelberg equilibriums when domestic 
public firm is leader L,FG and when private firm is 
leader F,LG . Also we compare the domestic social 
surplus of domestic firm and the profits of private firm. 
           
3. Leadership of the Domestic (Public) Firm 
 
     First, we consider the game where firm 2 (public 
one) is the leader. This corresponds to the agents’ 
strategies selected as follows: 32 12 == e,e . In other 
words, firm 2 chooses 2q  and firm 1 (the private one) 
chooses 1q  after observing 2q , so as to maximize its 
net profit ( ) ( ) ( )1111 qfqGpq,G −=Π .  
       Let ( )Gq1  be the reaction function of firm 1; that 
is, the value that satisfies: 
             
( ) ( ).q,GGq
q
1
0
1
1
Πmax arg
 ≥
=   (8)                                   
By the strict convexity of the cost function 1f  and by 
assumption A3, this reaction function is well-defined.     
                                                      
Lemma 3. Under assumptions A1 – A4, 
 |||| ( ) 11 <G'q    for all 1G~G ≠ .                            (9)                
Moreover, ( ) 0011 <−G~'q , and ( ) 0011 =+G~'q .||||| 
||||||| 
Now firm 2 (domestic producer) chooses 02 ≥≡ Qq  
so as to maximize 
    
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ),QfQGqQGpdqqp
Q,QGSQS
QG
21
0
2
−−=
=≡

        (10)                           
where | ( ) ( )( ) QQGqQG += 1 .                              
       Definition 3 . Now we recall that the Stackelberg 
equilibrium (with the domestic firm as a leader and the 
foreign firm as a follower) is the vector ( )( ) 31 +∈= RQ,Qq,GZ LLFL,F  such that                   
                
( ) LLFL,F QQqG += 1 ,                            (11) 
                
( ){ }01 ≥∈ QQSmaxArgQL     ,           (12)                                                                  
    
( ) ( ){ }0111 ≥= qq,GmaxargQq L,FLF    Π .      (13)                                            
     Now we establish relationships to compare the 
production volumes of the firms at the Stackelberg 
equilibrium (11) – (13) with those at the Cournot 
equilibrium defined by the complementarity problem 
(5) – (7). Besides, it is interesting to compare the 
values CQ  and LQ  to the domestic firm’s optimum 
output volume PQ at the perfect competition 
equilibrium, that is, when the domestic producer 
ignores the price variation and solves the following 
complementarity problem: Find a 0≥Q such that 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ,QGpQ'fQ 022 ≥−=β and ( ) 02 =QQβ . (14)                       
        Theorem 3. Under assumptions A1 – A4, the 
following estimates hold: 
         
{ }30 H,Q,QminQ LCP ≤< ;                        (15)                                     
here 3H  is the parameter from Remark 2.                | 
     Note that the estimates obtained in Theorem 3 
involve the expressions { }LC Q,Qmin  and 
{ }LC Q,Qmax , because assumptions A1 – A4 in 
general do not imply the (strict) concavity of the 
leader’s (domestic social surplus) function ( )QS2  over 
all 0≥Q . Now we introduce an additional assumption 
which allows one to establish this concavity of the 
domestic social surplus function and hence deduce 
more exact global comparative static results making 
use of some local information only. 
       A5. Assume that the foreign firm’s cost function is 
linear:  
      
( ) 1111 qcqf = , for all ,q 01 ≥                          (16a)                         
where 01 >c  is a constant, and the inverse demand 
function has the following property: the ratio ( )( )G'p
G''p
 
is a differentiable function of 0>G , and the following 
estimate holds: 
               
( ) ( )( )G'p
G''p
G
G
'p
''p
dG
d
⋅−≥




 1
.              (16b)                                        
Lemma 4. Under assumptions A1 – A5 and with the 
leadership of the domestic supplier, the domestic social 
surplus function ( )QS2  is strictly convex over 0≥Q .  
       Now we obtain the complete comparison static 
classification for the above particular case.  
Theorem 4.  Under conditions of Lemma 4, the 
following global estimates based upon the local 
information are true.          
(i) If ( ) 10 ≤−CQ'G  and ( ) 10 =+CQ'G , then CL QQ = , hence 
( ) ( )CL QGQG = . This case can occur 
only at the point 1G~QQ CL == . 
(ii) If ( ) 10 >−CQ'G  then CL QQ > , 
hence ( ) ( )CL QGQG > . 
(iii) If ( ) 10 <+CQ'G  then CL QQ < , 
hence ( ) ( )CL QGQG < .                        
 
4. Leadership of the Foreign (Private) Firm 
     Now consider the game where firm 1 (foreign 
private firm) is the leader. Firm 1 chooses  1q  and firm 
2 (domestic or public supplier) chooses 2q  after 
observing 1q , so as to maximize the social surplus.  
        
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )221
0
2 qfGpqdqqpq,GS
G
−−=  ;      (21)                         
here, as previously,  21 qqG += .                                                      
     Let ( )Gq2  be the reaction function of firm 2; that 
is, the quantity that satisfies the condition below: 
           
( ) ( )2
0
2
2
q,GSmaxargGq
q ≥
= .                        (22)                         
Definition 4. The Stackelberg equilibrium (with the 
foreign firm as a leader and the domestic firm as a 
follower) is the vector ( )( ) 3121 +∈= RQq,Q,GZ LFLF,L  
such that 
        
( )LFLF,L QqQG 121 += ,                                    (23)                           
 
         
( ){ }01111 ≥∈ QQmaxArgQL  Π ,                 (24)                              
       
( ) ( ){ }0222 ≥= qq,GSmaxargQq F,LLF  .      (25)                           
In what follows we establish relationships which allow 
one to compare the production volumes of the market 
players at the Stackelberg equilibrium (23) – (25) to 
those at the Cournot equilibrium defined with the 
complementarity problem (5) – (7). Besides, it is 
instructive to compare the values CQ1  and LQ1  to the 
foreign firm’s optimum output PQ1 at the perfect 
competition equilibrium, that is, when the foreign 
(private) producer ignores variations in price and 
solves the following complementarity problem: Find a 
01 ≥Q  such that  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ,QGpQ'fQ 011111 ≥−≡β  and ( ) 0111 =QQβ .                                                 
     Theorem 5.  Under assumptions A1 – A4, the 
following relationships are valid: 
                11110 HQQQ PLC ≤≤≤≤ .               (26)                       
     Remark 3. Due to the property ( ) 01 >Q'G , 
inequalities (29) imply the relationships 
   
( ) ( ) ( )PF,LLCC QGGQGQGG 111 ≤=≤=  .           (27)                                                           
Therefore, the leadership of the private firm is better 
for the individual consumer than the Cournot 
competition between the private and public producers, 
as the former may bring to a lower retail price of the 
good at the market.                                                        
5. Conclusions 
 
The paper extends the results of existence and 
uniqueness of the conjectural variations equilibrium at 
oligopolistic markets with homogeneous product and 
similar agents (using profit functions of the same structure 
with probably different parameters) to the duopoly of 
agents with essentially distinct object functions. One of the 
competitors is a foreign firm maximizing her expected 
profit, whereas the second agent is a domestic firm aiming 
at maximizing the social surplus. This diversity of the 
competitors’ targets makes the investigation more complex 
as in the case of homogeneous agents, but it allows one to 
obtain new interesting results concerning the comparative 
static between the Cournot and Stackelberg formulations of 
the model. To do that, we introduce the concepts of weak 
and strong firms, in dependence of their reaction functions 
and show that the domestic social surplus is higher if the 
leader is strong than when the leader is weak.   
In this paper we prove that, if the inverse demand 
function is convex, the domestic public firm is follower 
and private public firm could be strong or weak. These 
results complement those obtained by Matsumura [4] who 
demonstrate that if the demand function is concave the 
domestic public firm is strong and private firm is always 
weak.  
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